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a b s t r a c t 
Data deduplication eliminates redundant data and is receiving increasing attention in cloud storage ser- 
vices due to the proliferation of big data and the demand for eﬃcient storage. Data deduplication not 
only requires a consummate technological designing, but also involves multiple parties with conﬂict in- 
terests. Thus, how to design incentive mechanisms and study their acceptance by all relevant stakeholders 
remain important open issues. In this paper, we detail the payoff structure of a client-controlled dedu- 
plication scheme and analyze the feasibilities of uniﬁed discount and individualized discount under this 
structure. Through game theoretical study, a privacy-preserving individualized discount-based incentive 
mechanism is further proposed with detailed implementation algorithms for choosing strategies, setting 
parameters and granting discounts. After theoretical analysis on the requirements of individual rational- 
ity, incentive compatibility, and proﬁtability, we conduct extensive experiments based on a real-world 
dataset to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism. 
© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
Storing data in the cloud saves local storage spaces and reduces 
data management and operation costs. A data user can easily ac- 
cess its data in the cloud at any time and everywhere. Signiﬁcant 
efforts have been made to securely and eﬃciently outsource data 
to the cloud in recent years, ranging from protecting data secu- 
rity and privacy ( Chu et al., 2014; Wan et al., 2012; Wang et al., 
2010a; 2011; Wei et al., 2014 ), reducing copyright risks ( Hwang 
et al., 2009; Hwang and Li, 2010 ), controlling data access ( Ruj et al., 
2014; Wang et al., 2010b; Yan et al., 2017a; Yang and Jia, 2014; 
Zhou et al., 2013 ), to encrypted data deduplication ( Harnik et al., 
2010; Li et al., 2014; 2015; Liu et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2009; Yan 
et al., 2016a; 2016b; 2017b ). 
Cloud data deduplication greatly beneﬁts Cloud Service 
Providers (CSPs). One data ﬁle might be uploaded by many users or 
by a single user multiple time either intentionally or unintention- 
ally. A CSP with deduplication only stores one copy of every data 
ﬁle in either plaintext or encrypted form, and be able to provide 
all of its users a way to access the data based on certain access 
control policies. Hence, data deduplication can greatly reduce the 
storage overhead of CSPs and allow them to pass the cost savings 
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to their users. There is no doubt that a CSP with less service fee 
can attract more data users, thus possibly gain more proﬁts. 
There are many schemes in the literature on deduplication over 
encrypted data in the cloud to achieve both data security and eco- 
nomic data storage. One prominent method is the client-side dedu- 
plication scheme, in which a data user only needs to upload the 
real data if the data has never been stored before. It saves more 
uplink bandwidth and CSP operation costs, and are widely studied 
by most researchers. Based on the eligibility veriﬁcation and ac- 
cess control policies, we can classify the client-side deduplication 
scheme into client-controlled client-side deduplication (C-DEDU) 
and server-controlled client-side deduplication (S-DEDU). 
However, almost all existing deduplication schemes ( Harnik 
et al., 2010; Li et al., 2014; 2015; Liu et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2009; 
Yan et al., 2016a; 2016b; 2017b ) are designed and analyzed only 
from technological perspectives. Few effort s in the literature were 
made to investigate the acceptability of deduplication schemes by 
all stakeholders (e.g., data users and CSPs). Only when a scheme 
brings tangible proﬁts to its stakeholders can it be adopted in prac- 
tice. In this paper, we focus on how to promote the acceptance of 
C-DEDU while the practical deployment problems in S-DEDU are 
studied in another line of our work. 
Three kinds of stakeholders are involved in C-DEDU including 
data owners, data holders and CSPs. A data owner is the ﬁrst one 
to upload a data and the later ones to upload are called data hold- 
ers. Once a data holder requires to store this data, the data owner 
checks the eligibility of this holder and only grants the access right 
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to the eligible ones. CSP is the entity that provides cloud storage 
service. 
Data owners have privileges due to the access control rights, 
however, need to keep online to perform this control. Various tech- 
niques have been proposed to mitigate the online requirement of 
data owners. In Yan et al. (2016a) , a scheme was proposed to allow 
data owners to hand over the right of controlling data deduplica- 
tion to a server. Harnik et al. (2010) introduced a simple mech- 
anism that turns off deduplication artiﬁcially to ensure privacy 
preservation. A ﬂexible deduplication scheme, which adaptively se- 
lects stakeholders control data deduplication according to the data 
protection policies of data owners, was introduced in Yan et al. 
(2017b) . However, these methods either change C-DEDU into S- 
DEDU to avoid the online requirement or are not intelligent. Be- 
cause the combination of client-side access control and deduplica- 
tion introduces service-delay to data holders when the owner is 
temporarily oﬄine, some time-sensitive data holders may be re- 
luctant to adopt C-DEDU. 
CSP is the direct beneﬁciary of deduplication schemes since 
they are primarily designed to save the storage cost of CSPs. There- 
fore, it is essential for a CSP to motivate the participation enthu- 
siasm of data owners and data holders. Even though this neces- 
sity of incentives is mentioned by researchers, they either failed 
to propose a concrete mechanism ( Liu et al., 2015 ), or the pro- 
posed mechanisms have privacy defect ( Armknecht et al., 2015 ) or 
are proved to be not incentive compatible ( Liang et al., 2019; Miao 
et al., 2015 ). Moreover, the complex interdependence among the 
various stakeholders in deduplication schemes increases the diﬃ- 
culty of weighting the proﬁts from the stakeholders’ perspective. 
Game theory, as a mathematical model of conﬂict and cooperation 
study between rational players, has natural advantages to address 
this problem. It helps to analyze how data owners and data holders 
choose strategies based on their utility functions. Unfortunately, to 
our knowledge, no systematically economic model for C-DEDU has 
been proposed until now. 
In this paper, we ﬁrst specify the employed economic model 
and introduce the detailed utility functions of data owners, data 
holders and CSPs. Then we apply game theory to analyze how 
data owners and data holders react according to different discount- 
charging models of CSPs and discuss the existence of Nash Equi- 
librium. To overcome the free-riding behaviors privacy issues, we 
propose a privacy-preserving incentive mechanism that can moti- 
vate rational players (i.e., data owners and data holders) to be hon- 
est. Furthermore, we conduct experiments to verify our theoretical 
analysis and illustrate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism 
with a real-world dataset. Speciﬁcally, the contributions of this pa- 
per can be summarized as below: 
1. We systematically propose an economic model for a cloud 
storage system with C-DEDU. The detailed utility function of 
each stakeholder is deeply discussed as well. 
2. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of two in- 
centive mechanisms (i.e., uniﬁed discount and individualized 
discount) with a game model between a data owner and a 
data holder. We ﬁnd that the individualized discount is more 
desirable due to the existence of Nash Equilibrium although 
it may intrude privacy. 
3. We further present a new privacy-preserving incentive 
mechanism that is incentive compatible and motivates ratio- 
nal players (i.e., data owners and data holders) to be honest, 
thus eliminate the disadvantage of individualized discount. 
4. We provide Parameter-Setting Algorithm, Discount-Granting 
Algorithm, and Strategy-Choosing Algorithms to instruct 
how our proposed incentive mechanism can be imple- 
mented in practice. 
5. We discuss how the proposed incentive mechanism is com- 
patible with existing encrypted data deduplication schemes 
and its scalability and robustness when being triggered by 
modiﬁcation attacks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Back- 
ground and related works are brieﬂy reviewed in Section 2 . 
Section 3 overviews the cloud storage system with C-DEDU, and 
details its deployment problems, along with clearly speciﬁed 
game-model assumptions. An economic model for the cloud stor- 
age system with C-DEDU is proposed in Section 4 based on the 
assumptions. In Section 5 , we perform game-theoretical analysis 
on two discount methods and propose a privacy-preserving in- 
dividualized discount-based incentive mechanism, which is able 
to achieve individual rationality, incentive compatibility and prof- 
itability. In Section 6 , we evaluate the effectiveness of our pro- 
posed incentive mechanism in promoting the acceptance of C- 
DEDU through a set of experiments based on a real-world dataset 
and further discuss its compatibility, scalability and robustness. Fi- 
nally, concluding remarks are drawn in the last section. 
2. Background and related work 
2.1. Game theory 
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics but develops 
considerably in the ﬁeld of economics. It has been widely deployed 
in many ﬁelds, such as economics, psychology, and even biology. 
It can ﬂexibly and masterly capture the interactions between dif- 
ferent participants. It studies how a rational entity will choose its 
strategy based on its preference and known information about the 
others at each step. Researchers in the ﬁeld of security and privacy 
( Do et al., 2017; Manshaei et al., 2013 ) also initiate applying game 
theory to analyze the interactions among system players. 
Player, action, information, strategy, payoff function and equi- 
librium are the essential elements to describe a game. Each par- 
ticipant as a player can make its own decision based on the ob- 
tained information that refers to all messages about the other play- 
ers, like their payoff functions. After all players make decisions and 
take actions, they will obtain payoffs according to their interac- 
tions. When every player in a game has no incentive to change 
actions, we say this game reaches its equilibrium. The Nash Equi- 
librium (NE) in a non-cooperative game is a state where no player 
can gain more proﬁts by deviating its current strategy. 
2.2. Encrypted data deduplication 
Current storage service faces the explosively growing digital 
data and the additional storage costs caused by the inadver- 
tent multiple storages and backup considerations. A recent study 
( Meyer and Bolosky, 2012 ) performed by Microsoft shows that 
about 68% data are stored with duplication. 
Deduplication is a popular technique for CSPs because it elimi- 
nates redundant copies of data stored in the cloud and substitutes 
them with pointers to a shared copy. Considering data privacy, data 
users prefer to upload encrypted data to the cloud. Before upload- 
ing the real data, the users calculate their data ﬁngerprints based 
on hash functions and send to CSP for duplication check. Only the 
data whose ﬁngerprint has not been stored before will be required 
to upload. Therefore, this kind of deduplication can save not only 
storage spaces but also network bandwidth consumption. A piece 
of data could be deduplicated at the ﬁle-level ( Bolosky et al., 20 0 0 ) 
or the chunk-level ( Pooranian et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2018 ), while 
the latter one is more popular for advance compression perfor- 
mance ( Xia et al., 2016 ). 
Deduplication percentage is a parameter to indicate the effect 
of deduplication ( Harnik et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2015 ). Let ρ i 
k (t) be 
the deduplication percentage of an owner o i 
k ’s data at time t , then 
ρ i k ( t ) = 
T i 
k ( t ) − S i k (t) 
T i 
k ( t ) 
×100% , (1) 
where T i 
k ( t ) is the total data size requested to be stored by c k at 
time t and S i 
k (t) is the total size of data that really stored by c k at 
time t . If ρk ( t ) denotes the deduplication percentage of c k at time 
t , then 
ρk ( t ) = 
∑ 
i 
T i 
k ( t ) − S i k (t) 
T i 
k ( t ) 
×100% . (2) 
The necessity of incentive in deduplication has attracted re- 
searchers’ attention and interests. Liu et al. (2015) encouraged the 
presence of incentives in motivating data holders to participate in 
the deduplication scheme designed by them even though they did 
not solve this issue in their paper. Armknecht et al. (2015) devel- 
oped ClearBox to enable the data holders to check the deduplica- 
tion status in a CSP and guarantee a data holder to receive a cor- 
rect discount with ClearBox. However, the authors did not discuss 
how to arrange the discounts and how to prevent privacy disclo- 
sure when granting discounts. The discount formulation proposed 
by Miao et al. (2015) is proved to be lack of incentive compatibility 
for CSPs by Liang et al. (2019) . 
For more details about encrypted cloud data deduplication 
schemes, which are not mentioned too much in this paper, the in- 
terested readers are recommended to refer to Yan et al. (2019) . 
2.3. Related work 
Selﬁsh behaviors are hard to be eliminated in the design of a 
secure scheme only from a technological perspective. The game 
theoretical analysis offers great help in solving this issue and en- 
suring the acceptance and long-term development of the scheme. 
It has been applied in the ﬁelds of cloud computing and network- 
ing. Yu et al. (2013) used a game theoretical method to analyze 
how vehicles optimally share resources to improve network per- 
formance when exploiting cloud computing in vehicular networks. 
In wireless multimedia social networks, Nan et al. (2014) pro- 
posed a distributed bandwidth allocation method based on game 
theory to effectively avoid selﬁsh behaviors of players. Then, re- 
source and reward fair allocation was addressed with a coopera- 
tive game theoretical approach in Niyato et al. (2011) . Researchers 
in ( Palmieri et al., 2013 ) proposed a game theory-based distributed 
task scheduling scheme that can eliminate all entities’ selﬁsh be- 
haviors in the cloud and achieve social optimality. 
Incentive mechanisms can help in addressing selﬁsh behaviors. 
Xu et al. (2016) presented how an incentive mechanism can elimi- 
nate selﬁsh behaviors in mobile social networks and promote play- 
ers’ active participation. Moreover, reputation mechanisms can in- 
duce players to cooperate with each other ( Wang et al., 2015 ). 
Reward and punishment mechanisms can improve mutual trust 
between nodes in a cloud system ( Wong et al., 2014 ), which 
ensures healthy system development. Wong et al. (2014) game- 
theoretically analyzed how a reputation-based cloud data access 
control system can be accepted by all system stakeholders by in- 
troducing a compensation mechanism and a punishment mech- 
anism. Shen et al. (2014) formulated a trust-based punishment 
mechanism to incent network entities in a global trust manage- 
ment system to behave cooperatively. 
However, the literature has not yet investigated the acceptance 
of cloud data deduplication and explored an effective mechanism 
to support its practical deployment and operation. 
Fig. 1. A cloud storage system with C-DEDU. 
3. System model and problem statement 
3.1. System model 
There is a CSP c k with M k unique data to be stored and 
N k data users. Let D k and U k represent the data set and user 
set. For each data d m 
k ∈ D k , the number of its data users is de- 
noted as n m 
k , then 
∑ M k 
m =1 n 
m 
k = N k . Then D k = { d m k | m = 1 , 2 , . . . , M k } 
and U k = 
{
u n 
k 
∣∣ n = 1 , 2 , . . . , N k }= ⋃ m U k,m , where U k,m = { u s k,m | s = 
1 , 2 , . . . , n m 
k } . 
When c k adopts C-DEDU, U k can be divided into a data owner 
set O k and a data holder set H k . O k = 
{
o i 
k 
∣∣ i = 1 , 2 , . . . , M k } = 
{ u 1 
k,m | m = 1 , 2 , . . . , M k } is composed of the ﬁrst data uploader 
of all the unique data in c k . The data holder set is com- 
posed of the rest of data users. H k = 
{ 
h 
j 
k 
∣∣∣ j = 1 , 2 , . . . , N k − M k 
} 
= ⋃ 
m U k,m \{ u 1 k,m } = 
⋃ 
m { u s k,m | s = 2 , . . . , M k } . 
The data owners and data holders are the data users of CSPs. In 
C-DEDU, the data owner uploads its data to the cloud and controls 
the data access by verifying the eligibility of data holders. Only an 
eligible data holder can access the encrypted data stored in the 
cloud. Fig. 1 shows the structure of a cloud storage system with 
C-DEDU. 
The procedure of C-DEDU is brieﬂy described as below: 
1. A CSP receives a data storage request, which contains the 
data ﬁngerprint/hash value, from a data user. 
2. The CSP checks if this data has been stored already by check- 
ing the existence of the ﬁngerprint/hash value of this data 
(i.e., duplication check). If not, it requires the user to up- 
load this data in an encrypted form and regards this user as 
the owner of this data. Otherwise, it contacts the real data 
owner for deduplication. 
3. When a data owner receives a deduplication request, it con- 
trols the data access by checking the data user’s eligibility 
and only issuing keys to the eligible ones. It also notiﬁes the 
CSP for successful deduplication. 
4. The eligible users, called data holders, can access and de- 
crypt the cloud data with the keys from the data owner. 
3.2. Problem Statement 
Past work ( Yan et al., 2016b ) demonstrated the security and ef- 
ﬁciency of C-DEDU. However, its deployment in a practical market 
depends on whether each system stakeholder can obtain expected 
proﬁts. In particular, this scheme may confront the following prob- 
lems in practical deployment. 
C-DEDU requires the data owners to keep online so that they 
need to pay a relatively high cost to perform deduplication than 
data holders. If a data user cannot obtain enough incentive from 
this scheme, C-DEDU cannot be implemented smoothly. On the 
other hand, it is diﬃcult to guarantee data owners to be online all 
the time, thus service delay is hard to avoid. This delay may cause 
data holders’ serious economic losses in some cases. 
CSPs adjust its storage fee according to the saved storage spaces 
to appear more subscribers; however, the adjustment is compli- 
cated. If a CSP sets the same unit storage fee for all data users, 
a data user can obtain this offer no matter it honestly follows C- 
DEDU or not. Therefore, they may modify their raw data somehow 
to avoid deduplication for fast storage service. Obviously, this self- 
ish behavior is disliked by CSPs and damages the interests of the 
others that make contributions. Setting different unit storage fee 
for different subscribers may be too complicated and impractical 
to implement. If the holders of the same data pay the same ad- 
justed storage fee, data privacy issue arises since a curious data 
holder can infer the existence of a data if its storage fee is ad- 
justed. Therefore, the charging model of CSPs deserves deeply in- 
vestigated. 
Even though a CSP holds the absolute control of designing the 
charge model, it only survives when having massive users. The 
utilities of data users (i.e., data owners and data holders) and CSPs 
are directly linked. Data users pay for the cloud storage services of- 
fered by CSPs and CSPs spend some costs to provide such services. 
How to balance proﬁts and interests among them is an interesting 
and practical problem. 
By taking the above problems into consideration, we aim to 
propose an incentive mechanism that can promote the acceptance 
of C-DEDU to all system stakeholders (i.e., data owners, data hold- 
ers and CSPs) and suppress selﬁsh behaviors in practical imple- 
mentation. 
3.3. Assumptions 
In what follows, we propose a number of assumptions based 
on Gao et al. (in press), Yan et al. (2016b) . These assumptions play 
as the basis of our game theoretical analysis on the acceptance of 
C-DEDU with the proposed incentive mechanism. 
Game assumption : All players are rational that they choose their 
own strategies that can bring the best proﬁts. The acceptance of 
cloud storage system has been proved in Gao et al. (in press) , thus 
we simply assume that all stakeholders would like to choose cloud 
storage. Local storage will not be a strategy for any players in our 
game model. 
Scheme assumption : On the basis of the security analysis of C- 
DEDU ( Yan et al., 2016b ), the C-DEDU scheme is secure even when 
the CSPs cannot be fully trusted. Ineligible users and curious CSPs 
have no opportunities to access the raw data stored at the CSP. 
Therefore, data leakage is beyond our consideration in this paper. 
All CSPs can cooperate with each other to provide cloud storage 
services. Namely, inter-CSP deduplication is considered. We assume 
the interaction among CSPs is in a smooth and secure manner. 
Thus, there are no security concerns aroused during their inter- 
actions. A data owner should be online to send a deduplication- 
successful message. Therefore, it will not fake a deduplication- 
successful message since it will perform the C-DEDU and do not 
need to fake a message if it is online. 
User assumption : The operation cost of a data owner to conduct 
C-DEDU is related to the number of data holders since it only per- 
forms C-DEDU when a user requests to store the same data. To 
simplify our analysis, we assume each data user requests to store 
one data at a time and obtains the same beneﬁts for cloud storage. 
Note that there is no incentive for an owner to upload invalid data. 
First, if the data is modiﬁed before the duplication check, then the 
ﬁngerprint of this data changes. The other data holders will not be 
detected as the same data users with this owner. Second, if the 
data is modiﬁed after the owner sent the ﬁngerprint to CSP, it is 
easy to be detected by the CSP in the duplication check process 
since the modiﬁed data does not match with the previous data 
ﬁngerprint. Each data upload request is in accordance with a data 
user index. A holder uploads its data several times will be granted 
with several indices. Refer to Proposition 2 in Liang et al. (2019) , 
creating multiple copies of data intentionally will not bring a user 
more proﬁts. Therefore, we keep our application scenario simpli- 
ﬁed by assuming that a data holder will not upload the same data 
more than one piece. When a user requires storing data at a CSP 
with deduplication while the data owner is oﬄine, the user suffers 
from the storage-service delay. We assume data users are time- 
sensitive and different data users have different time sensitivities, 
which is a parameter to instantiate the inﬂuence of service delay 
on the cloud storage beneﬁt of a data user. More sensitive to ser- 
vice delay means a user gains less beneﬁts when the data owner is 
oﬄine. Therefore, they suffer from some loss when storage-service 
delay happens. The loss is related to the cloud-storage beneﬁt since 
the delay hinders the holders to enjoy cloud storage beneﬁts. Due 
to the individualization of data users, we assume different data 
holders have different time sensitivities and different data own- 
ers have different possibilities to be oﬄine when providing the C- 
DEDU service. 
Data assumption : For the simpliﬁcation of our model and simu- 
lation, we assume all data have the same size; therefore, the same 
storage fee and storage cost. Nevertheless, different data belong 
to different numbers of users. A data may be modiﬁed slightly 
by a holder to escape from being detected as duplicated. We as- 
sume this modiﬁcation does not inﬂuence the data size. Further- 
more, in privacy-preserving data deduplication schemes, the ﬁn- 
gerprint/hash functions chosen in the duplication check procedure 
can normally make sure even if a slight change in the data content 
will result in a totally different output (or ﬁngerprint/hash value). 
Therefore, a holder can slightly modify its data by adding a string 
of meaningless characters to avoid being detected as duplicated, 
but not burden with additional costs. 
CSP assumption : We assume the storage and maintenance cost 
of a CSP is related to the number of data stored. Their C-DEDU op- 
eration cost is related to the total number of users. Note that there 
is a basic operation cost spent by CSP. But it exists no matter C- 
DEDU is applied or not. Thus, we ignore it in our economic model. 
4. Economic model 
Before starting to solve the above problems from the view of 
economics, we summarize the notations used in this paper in 
Table 1 for clear presentation and easy reference. 
In this section, we build up an economic model to calculate the 
utilities of data owners, data holders and CSPs, respectively. Since 
CSPs hold absolute control over designing the charging model, we 
mainly consider the game between the data owner and data hold- 
ers. We present the utilities of all stakeholders under different sit- 
uations as follows. 
4.1. Payoff structure in cloud storage without C-DEDU 
We ﬁrst present the utility functions of data users and CSPs in 
a cloud storage system without any deduplication schemes. 
For a user u n 
k with data d 
m 
k stored at the CSP c k , cloud storage 
provides it data-access convenience and local storage saving. As a 
proﬁtable organization, c k also requires the data user to pay for 
this service. Let b f 
n 
k ( t ) and s f 
n 
k ( t ) denote the capitalization of the 
cloud storage beneﬁts (including easy-access, cross-device-access, 
local-storage-saving, etc.) and the storage-service fee of u n 
k at time 
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Table 1 
Notations. 
Notations Descriptions 
o i 
k , h 
j 
k A speciﬁc data owner/holder; 
D, d, m, M The indications of parameters that are related to data; 
O, o, i The indications of parameters that are related to data owners; 
H, h, j The indications of parameters that are related to data holders; 
U, u, n The indications of parameters that are related to data users; 
c, k The indications of parameters that are related to CSPs; 
f The function mapping from the index of a data holder to that of its data owner; 
bf k The beneﬁts for cloud storing at k ; 
sf k The storage-service fee paid to k ; 
αk The discount of the storage-service fee that k sets; 
rf k / RF k The unit/total request fee paid by k ; 
oc g / OC g The unit/total C-DEDU operation cost of g , where g = o, c; 
sc The storage cost; 
U g The utility function of g , where g = o, h, u, c; 
ε The possibility of a data owner to be oﬄine; 
l The loss of a data holder suffering from service delay; 
θ The time sensitivity of a data holder; 
η The data holder number threshold set by k privately. 
t , respectively, the payoff structure of u n 
k without C-DEDU at time 
t is 
U n u ( t ) = b f n k ( t ) −s f n k ( t ) (3) 
According to the above analysis, CSP c k receives s f 
n 
k ( t ) from ev- 
ery data user u n 
k for providing cloud storage service. However, it 
also needs to pay the storage and maintenance cost sc n 
k ( t ) for each 
data user u n 
k . Therefore, the payoff structure of c k without C-DEDU 
at time t is 
U k c ( t ) = 
∑ 
n 
s f 
n 
k ( t ) −
∑ 
n 
sc n k ( t ) (4) 
4.2. Payoff structure in cloud storage with C-DEDU 
When C-DEDU is applied in the cloud storage system, data 
users are divided into a group of data owners and a group of data 
holders. 
Data owner o i 
k is the ﬁrst one to upload data d 
m 
k at CSP c k at 
time t . It obtains the cloud storage beneﬁts b f 
i 
k ( t ) and pays the 
storage-service fee s f 
i 
k ( t ) with some discount α
i 
k ( t ) . The discount 
is discounted on the storage-service fee, which is the incentive that 
a CSP provides to its users. It can be a uniﬁed discount or an indi- 
vidualized discount. The more data are deduplicated, the more dis- 
count is granted. Besides this, C-DEDU requires it some operation 
costs OC i o ( t ) for performing deduplication and keeping online. In 
order to motivate data owners, CSP c k pays the request fee RF 
i 
k ( t ) 
to o i 
k for the successful access of data holders at time t . We con- 
clude the payoff structure of data owner o i 
k at time t when C-DEDU 
is applied as 
U i o ( t ) = b f i k ( t ) + RF i k ( t ) −
(
1 −αi k ( t ) 
)
× s f i k ( t ) − OC i o ( t ) . (5) 
The data holder h 
j 
k shares the same payoff structure with data 
users and obtains the discount α j 
k ( t ) on the storage-service fee. 
However, it suffers from the service-delay loss l j ( t ) when it can- 
not receive a quick reply from o i 
k with the possibility εi ( t ) at time 
t . Therefore, when C-DEDU is applied, the payoff structure of h 
j 
k at 
time t is 
U j 
h ( t ) = b f 
j 
k ( t ) −
(
1 −α j 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f j 
k ( t ) − ε i (t) × l j ( t ) . (6) 
According to the above analysis, CSP c k receives discounted 
storage-service fees from all data owners and data holders and 
stores only the data of data owners. OC k c ( t ) represents the total op- 
eration cost of c k for performing C-DEDU at time t. c k also needs to 
pay some request fees to the data owners as stated above. There- 
fore, the payoff structure of c k with C-DEDU at time t is concluded 
as 
U k c ( t ) = 
∑ 
i 
(
1 −αi k ( t ) 
)
× s f i k ( t ) − RF i k ( t ) −sc i k ( t ) 
+ 
∑ 
i 
∑ 
j, f ( j ) = i 
(
1 −α j 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f j 
k ( t ) − OC k c ( t ) . (7) 
4.3. Utility functions 
The success of C-DEDU relies on its acceptance by data owners, 
data holders and CSPs. However, C-DEDU requires data owners to 
be online all the time, which will bring them high operation costs. 
Moreover, the loss caused by service delay hinders the acceptance 
of time-sensitive data holders. Introducing C-DEDU greatly relieves 
the storage costs of CSPs. CSP can play as a decisive party to grant 
its savings to data owners and data holders by giving them dis- 
counts and induce them to accept C-DEDU. In this section, we 
will further analyze the detailed composition of every stakeholder 
based on the game-model assumptions in Section 3.3 . 
We ﬁrst specify the strategy spaces of all players. For a data 
owner o i 
k , it can choose the possibility to be oﬄine, namely the 
value of εi ( t ). If it keeps online (i.e., ε i ( t ) = 0 ), we say it takes hon- 
est actions. If o i 
k has a possibility to be oﬄine (i.e., 0 < εi ( t ) ≤ 1), 
we say o i 
k is a strategic player. For a data holder h 
j 
k , it also has two 
strategies. If it follows the design of C-DEDU, we say it is honest. 
If it modiﬁes data to avoid being detected as duplicated, then it is 
taking the strategic action. 
In this subsection, we analyze the detailed utility functions of 
data owners and data holders who are both rational, based on our 
assumptions in Section 3.3 . A rational player (data owner or data 
holder) takes action from its strategy space {honest, strategic} ac- 
cording to which one can bring it more proﬁts. 
4.3.1. Utility function of data holder 
The proliferation of Internet technologies brings a variety of 
emerging services, like cloud computing. These services greatly fa- 
cilitate people’s life and become essential and irreplaceable now. 
In Gao et al. (in press) , the acceptance of cloud storage services 
has been demonstrated. Therefore, we assume all data users are 
delighted to store data in the cloud, then, 
b f 
δ
k ( t ) − s f δk ( t ) > 0 ( δ = n, i, j ) (8) 
is true for each data user. CSPs charge data users the storage- 
service fees according to the data size in a pay-per-use scenario. 
According to the data assumption and user assumption, each data 
has the same data size and all data users obtain the same ben- 
eﬁt from cloud storage. Hence, for every δ = n, i, j, b f δk ( t ) = b f k , 
s f 
δ
k ( t ) = s f k and bf k > sf k . As stated in Section 3.2 , the absence 
of data owner causes service delay to data holders and this de- 
lay impacts the beneﬁt from cloud storage. Therefore, we assume 
the service-delay loss l j ( t ) of data holder h 
j 
k is related to the cloud 
storage beneﬁts b f 
j 
k ( t ) as l j ( t ) = θ j × b f 
j 
k ( t ) = θ j × b f k . The coeﬃ- 
cient θ j diverses with regards to j since different data holders have 
different time sensitivities. Hence, we can detail (6) as 
U j 
h ( t ) = 
(
1 − ε i × θ j 
)
× b f k −
(
1 −α j 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k . (9) 
4.3.2. Utility function of data owner 
A data owner is a privileged data user that can control data 
access and manage data. For a data owner o i 
k , b f 
i 
k ( t ) − s f i k ( t ) > 0 
holds as analyzed in Section 4.3.1 . Cloud storage service often 
works as a backup service. A data user may upload the same 
data several times and many data users may upload the same 
data to the cloud simultaneously or sequentially. As speciﬁed in 
Section 3.1 , a data owner needs to keep online to verify the eligi- 
bility of all data holders and issue keys to the eligible ones timely. 
Whether the data owner exploits its own resources or hires oth- 
ers’ resources to complete this series of operations, the cost can- 
not be ignored. It is reasonable to assume OC i o ( t ) is related to 
the number of data holders with deduplication at time t . Let the 
function f ( j, t ) = i represent that o i 
k is the owner of h 
j 
k at time 
t , then, OC i o ( t ) = 
∑ 
j, f ( j,t ) = i 
oc i o when oc 
i 
o represents the unit opera- 
tion cost of o i 
k . CSP c k pays the request fee RF 
i 
k ( t ) to o 
i 
k , which 
is related to how many times o i 
k has performed C-DEDU at time 
t . Then, RF i k ( t ) = 
∑ 
j, f ( j,t ) = i 
r f k , where rf k is the unit request fee. If 
o i 
k takes strategic behaviors that to be oﬄine with the possibility 
ε i , 0 < ε i ≤ 1, its operation cost and request fee are modiﬁed as 
(1 − ε i ) × OC i o ( t ) and (1 − ε i ) × RF i k ( t ) , respectively. Hence, we can 
extend (5) as 
U i o ( t ) = b f k −
(
1 −αi k ( t ) 
)
× s f k + ( 1 −ε i ) ×
∑ 
j, f ( j,t ) = i 
(
r f k − oc i o 
)
. (10) 
Notably, αi 
k ( t ) = α
j 
k ( t ) when f ( j, t ) = i . 
4.3.3. Utility function of CSP 
When C-DEDU is not applied in c k , U 
k 
c ( t ) = ∑ 
n s f 
n 
k ( t ) −
∑ 
n sc 
n 
k ( t ) = 
∑ 
n s f k − sc k . With the cloud-storage 
acceptance assumption, sf k > sc k is a common condition through- 
out the whole paper. When c k adopts C-DEDU at time t , let n i ( t ) 
denote the total number of holders of o i 
k ’ data at time t . The 
storage cost sc i 
k ( t ) for storing this data is exactly the unit storage 
cost sc k since only one copy stores. The C-DEDU operation cost for 
this data is related to the number of data owner and data holders. 
Therefore, OC k c ( t ) = oc k c × ( 1+ n i ( t ) ) . The detailed utility function of 
CSP c k is concluded as 
U k c ( t ) = 
∑ 
i 
(
1 −αi k ( t ) 
)
× s f k − r f k × n i ( t ) −sc k 
+ 
∑ 
i 
∑ 
j, f ( j,t ) = i 
(
1 −α j 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k − oc k c × ( 1+ n i ( t ) ) . (11) 
5. Discount-based incentive mechanism 
There are two kinds of discount-based incentive mechanism for 
CSPs to choose. The ﬁrst one is a CSP grants discounts to all of its 
subscribers undifferentiatedly based on its saved storage space. The 
second one is to set the discount value for individual data based 
on how many times this data has been deduplicated. For simpliﬁ- 
cation, we call these two kinds of mechanism as uniﬁed discount 
and individualized discount, respectively. 
In this section, we ﬁrst present the requirements for an incen- 
tive mechanism to be feasible and analyze these two mechanisms 
based on the game theoretical interactions between a data owner 
and a data holder. We further propose a privacy-preservation in- 
centive mechanism and provide some algorithms to instruct its 
practical implementation. 
5.1. Requirements 
A feasible discount-based incentive mechanism should satisfy 
the following requirements ( Liang and Yan, 2019 ). 
Individual rationality : The introduction of an incentive mech- 
anism ensures the non-negative proﬁts for all players (i.e., data 
owners and data holders). 
Incentive compatibility : Deviating the scheme design will not 
bring a player more proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, a data holder will not gain 
more proﬁts by modifying its raw data to avoid being detected as 
duplicated. A data owner gains more proﬁts when keeping online. 
Proﬁtability : For the other party (i.e., CSP) except the players, 
the incentive mechanism should ensure its non-negative proﬁt. 
Combining with our economic model, we give the formal deﬁ- 
nitions of these requirements as follows. 
Deﬁnition 1. A discount-based incentive mechanism is individu- 
ally rational if for ∀ δ = o, j, U δ( t ) ≥ 0. 
Deﬁnition 2. A discount-based incentive mechanism is incentive 
compatible if it ensures any player with duplicated data can obtain 
more proﬁts by accepting C-DEDU and following the scheme pro- 
cedure honestly. Namely, for ∀ j , U j 
h ( t ) ≥ U 
j 
u ( t ) and for ∀ i , ∂U 
i 
o ( t ) 
∂ε i 
< 
0 . 
Deﬁnition 3. A discount-based incentive mechanism is proﬁtable 
for a CSP when the mechanism ensures its non-negative proﬁts, 
i.e., U k c ( t ) > 0 . 
5.2. Uniﬁed discount 
When CSP c k applies the uniﬁed discount, it calculates the 
value of discount according to the total storage spaces saved. All 
subscribers of c k are granted with the same discount no matter 
what strategies taken. The advantages of the uniﬁed discount are 
twofold. First, it can be easily conducted and reduce the com- 
putation cost of CSPs. The second and signiﬁcant advantage is a 
data holder cannot speculate the deduplication information of its 
data, like whether is deduplicated and the number of data hold- 
ers; therefore, it is resistant to side channel attacks. 
There is a data owner o i 
k and a data holder h 
j 
k . They are ratio- 
nal players and have the same data to store at c k . Table 2 shows 
the utility functions under the game between o i 
k and h 
j 
k when the 
uniﬁed discount is applied. The ﬁrst row represents the strategies 
of h 
j 
k while the ﬁrst column shows the strategies of o 
i 
k . The rests 
in this table are their utility arraies that the ﬁrst element is the 
utility of o i 
k and the second one is the utility of h 
j 
k . 
Proposition 1. With uniﬁed discount-based incentive mechanism, a 
rational data holder will always choose to be strategic. The best strat- 
egy for a data owner is to be strategic when the data holder is strate- 
gic. 
Proof. We ﬁrst ﬁnd the best strategy for h 
j 
k . h 
j 
k can ob- 
tain the same beneﬁt b f k −
(
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k when o i k is 
honest, no matter it is honest or strategic. When o i 
k is 
a strategic player, 
(
1 − ε i × θ j 
)
× b f k −
(
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k −
X. Liang, Z. Yan and R.H. Deng / Computers & Security 91 (2020) 101730 7 
Table 2 
Utility function matrix with uniﬁed discount. 
Honest Strategic 
Honest b f k −
(
1 −αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k + r f k − oc i o , 
b f k −
(
1 −α j 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
b f k −
(
1 −αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k − oc i o , 
b f k −
(
1 −α j 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
Strategic b f k −
(
1 −αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
+ ( 1 −ε i ) ×
(
r f k − oc i o 
)
, (
1 −ε i × θ j 
)
× b f k −
(
1 −α j 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
b f k −
(
1 −αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
−( 1 −ε i ) × oc i o , 
b f k −
(
1 −α j 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
Table 3 
Utility function matrix with individualized discount. 
Honest Strategic 
Honest b f k −
(
1 −αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k + r f k − oc i o , 
b f k −
(
1 −α j 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
b f k −
(
1 −αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k − oc i o , 
b f k − s f k 
Strategic b f k −
(
1 −αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
+ ( 1 −ε i ) ×
(
r f k − oc i o 
)
, (
1 −ε i × θ j 
)
× b f k −
(
1 −αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
b f k −
(
1 −αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
−( 1 −ε i ) × oc i o , b f k − s f k ( t ) 
(
b f k −
(
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k 
)
= −ε i × θ j × b f k < 0 , the best strat- 
egy for h 
j 
k is to be strategic. Therefore, to be strategic is the 
dominated strategy for h 
j 
k . 
When h 
j 
k is strategic, b f k −
(
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k − oc i o − b f k + (
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k + ( 1 −ε i ) × oc i o = −ε i × oc i o ≤ 0 , the best strategy 
for o i 
k is to be strategic. 
From Proposition 1 , (honest, honest) will never be the only 
Nash Equilibrium of this game since (strategic, strategic) is al- 
ready one NE according to the above analysis. The same discount 
is granted to all users. A rational data holder will always mod- 
ify its data to avoid being detected as duplicated. It not only ob- 
tains the discount but also reduces the risk of storage-service de- 
lay. Therefore, the data holder beneﬁts from C-DEDU without mak- 
ing any contribution. We call this behavior as free-riding behavior, 
which reduces the enthusiasm of other participants to contribute 
and makes the system collapse eventually. Therefore, applying the 
uniﬁed discount is not practical in C-DEDU. 
5.3. Individualized discount 
When CSP c k applies the individualized discount, it calculates 
the discount in terms of individual data. When data holder h 
j 
k 
modiﬁes its duplicated data as a unique one, c k will not give a dis- 
count to it. There is a data owner o i 
k and a data holder h 
j 
k . They are 
rational players and have the same data to store at c k . In Table 3 , 
the ﬁrst row represents the strategies of h 
j 
k while the ﬁrst column 
shows the strategies of o i 
k . The ﬁrst element of the rest cells is the 
utility of o i 
k and the second one is the utility of h 
j 
k . 
Proposition 2. With the individualized discount-based incentive 
mechanism, (honest, honest) is the only Nash Equilibrium when the 
following equations are satisﬁed simultaneously: 
α j 
k ( t ) > 
ε i × θ j × b f k 
s f k 
, (12) 
r f k > oc 
i 
o . (13) 
Proof. When h 
j 
k is strategic, b f k −
(
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k − oc i o − b f k + (
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k + ( 1 − ε i ) × oc i o = −ε i × oc i o < 0 always holds, the 
best strategy for o i 
k is to be strategic. When o 
i 
k is honest, b f k −(
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k − ( b f k − s f k ) = αi k ( t ) × s f k > 0 always holds, the 
best strategy for h 
j 
k is to be honest. 
If we want (honest, honest) to be the NE, the best strategy 
must be honest when h 
j 
k is honest. Namely, b f k −
(
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
×
s f k + r f k − oc i o − b f k + 
(
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k − ( 1 − ε i ) ×
(
r f k − oc i o 
)
should be positive. Then, r f k > oc 
i 
o . 
Furthermore, if we want (honest, honest) to be the unique 
NE, the best strategy for h 
j 
k must be honest when o 
i 
k is strategic. 
Namely 
(
1 − ε i × θ j 
)
× b f k −
(
1 − αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k − ( b f k − s f k ) should 
be a positive value. Then we get α j 
k ( t ) > 
ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
. 
From the above, if (honest, honest) is the only NE, r f k > oc 
i 
o and 
α j 
k ( t ) > 
ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
should be satisﬁed simultaneously. 
Analogously, we give the following conclusions without detailed 
proofs. 
1. When α j 
k ( t ) > 
ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
and r f k < oc 
i 
o , there is no Nash 
Equilibrium. 
2. When α j 
k ( t ) < 
ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
and r f k < oc 
i 
o , (strategic, strategic) is 
the only Nash Equilibrium. 
3. When α j 
k ( t ) < 
ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
and r f k > oc 
i 
o , there is two Nash 
Equilibria: (honest, honest) and (strategic, strategic). 
Individualized discount suppresses the free-riding behavior 
since a strategic data holder cannot obtain more beneﬁts than act- 
ing honestly. However, the privacy of the deduplication informa- 
tion may be violated since a data user can infer the existence of 
data by checking whether it can obtain a discount when upload- 
ing this data. To ensure data privacy, we set a random threshold 
for the discount on each data. Only when the number of holders 
of this data excesses the threshold, can they get the discounts. We 
will show how to implement this design in Section 5.4 . 
5.4. Individualized discount with privacy-preservation 
5.4.1. Feasibility analysis 
The individualized discount-based incentive mechanism should 
satisfy the requirements of individual rationality and incentive 
compatibility to data owners and data holders without decreasing 
the proﬁt of CSPs. Taking the utility functions into these require- 
ments, we obtain the following conclusions. 
Proposition 3. The individualized discount-based incentive mecha- 
nism is individually rational for the data holder h 
j 
k when 
α j 
k ( t ) ≥ 1 −
b f k 
s f k 
+ ε i × θ j × b f k 
s f k 
. (14) 
Proof. Taking α j 
k ( t ) ≥ 1 −
b f k 
s f k 
+ ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
into U 
j 
h ( t ) = (
1 − ε i × θ j 
)
× b f k −
(
1 − α j 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k , then 
U j 
h ( t ) ≥
(
1 − ε i × θ j 
)
× b f k −
(
1 −
(
1 − b f k 
s f k 
+ ε i × θ j × b f k 
s f k 
))
× s f k 
= 
(
1 − ε i × θ j 
)
× b f k −
(
b f k 
s f k 
− ε i × θ j × b f k 
s f k 
)
× s f k 
= 
(
1 − ε i × θ j 
)
× b f k − b f k − ε i ( t ) × θ j × b f k = 0 . 
Therefore, the individual rationality to h 
j 
k is ensured since U 
j 
h ( t ) ≥
0 . 
Proposition 4. The individualized discount-based incentive mecha- 
nism is incentive compatible for the data holder h 
j 
k when 
α j 
k ( t ) ≥
ε i × θ j × b f k 
s f k 
. (15) 
Proof. To extend U 
j 
h ( t ) −U 
j 
u ( t ) , we have b f 
j 
k ( t ) −
(
1 − α j 
k ( t ) 
)
×
s f 
j 
k ( t ) − ε i × l j ( t ) −
(
b f 
j 
k ( t ) − s f 
j 
k ( t ) 
)
= α j 
k ( t ) × s f k − ε i × θ j × b f k . 
We can easily obtain U 
j 
h ( t ) −U 
j 
u ( t ) ≥ 0 when taking α j k ( t ) ≥
ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
into the above equation. According to Deﬁnition 2 , 
U 
j 
h ( t ) ≥ U 
j 
u ( t ) means incentive compatibility to the data holder. 
Therefore, we have proved Proposition 4 . 
Corollary 1. When a discount-based incentive mechanism satisﬁes 
α j 
k ( t ) ≥
ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
, then this mechanism is individual rational and in- 
centive compatible to the data holder h 
j 
k . 
To ensure the individual rationality and incentive compatibil- 
ity simultaneously, α j 
k ( t ) should be no less than the bigger one 
between 1 − b f k 
s f k 
+ ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
and 
ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
. Since b f k > s f k , 
b f k 
s f k 
> 1 . 
Then 1 − b f k 
s f k 
+ ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
< 
ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
. Therefore, α j 
k ( t ) ≥
ε i ×θ j ×b f k 
s f k 
. 
Proposition 5. The individualized discount-based incentive mecha- 
nism is individually rational for the data owner o i 
k when 
αi k ( t ) ≥ 1 −
b f k 
s f k 
−
ε i ×
∑ 
j, f ( j,t ) = i 
(
r f k ( t ) − oc i o 
)
s f k 
. (16) 
Proposition 5 is easy to prove by taking (16) into U i o ( t ) = b f k −(
1 −αi 
k ( t ) 
)
× s f k + ( 1 − ε i ) ×
∑ 
j, f ( j,t ) = i 
(
r f k ( t ) − oc i o 
)
and evaluat- 
ing if the result is non-negative. 
Proposition 6. The individualized discount-based incentive mecha- 
nism is incentive compatible for the data owner o i 
k when 
r f k > oc 
i 
o . (17) 
Proof. In our economic model, bf k and oc 
i 
o are irrelevant to εi and 
CSPs do not determine αi 
k ( t ) , sf k and rf k according to the εi , there- 
fore, 
∂U i o ( t ) 
∂ε i 
= 
∑ 
j, f ( j,t ) = i 
(
oc i o ( t ) − r f k 
)
, (18) 
which is negative when r f k > oc 
i 
o . According to Deﬁnition 2 , the 
individualized discount-based incentive mechanism is incentive 
compatible for o i 
k when r f k > oc 
i 
o . 
Proposition 7. The individualized discount-based incentive mecha- 
nism is proﬁtable for the CSP c k when 
αi k ( t ) ≤ 1 −
sc k + r f k × n i ( t ) + oc k c × n i ( t ) 
s f k × ( 1 + n i ( t ) ) 
. (19) 
Proof. For data owner o i 
k , there are n i ( t ) data holders h 
j 
k , j = 
{ 1 , 2 , . . . , n i (t) } that want to upload the same data as o i k . The ben- 
eﬁts c k obtained from these users is (
1 − αi k ( t ) 
)
× s f k × ( 1 + n i ( t ) ) − sc k − r f k × n i ( t ) − oc k c × n i ( t ) . 
(20) 
The non-negative of (20) is guaranteed when 
αi k ( t ) ≤ 1 −
sc k + r f k × n i ( t ) + oc k c × n i ( t ) 
s f k × ( 1 + n i ( t ) ) 
. 

5.4.2. Algorithms 
In this subsection, we introduce the Parameter-Setting Algo- 
rithm (i.e., Algorithm 1) and Discount-Granting Algorithm (i.e., 
Algorithm 2) to show how CSPs implement the individualized 
discount-based incentive mechanism with privacy-preservation. 
The Strategy-Choosing Algorithms (i.e., Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 
4) illustrate how rational data owners and data holders to choose 
their best strategies according to their known parameters. 
We suggest CSP c k marking its duplication check result on h 
j 
k 
at time t as x 
j 
i (t) and recording the deduplication report on h 
j 
k 
at time t from o i 
k as y 
i 
j (t) . x 
j 
i ( t ) = 1 indicates h 
j 
k ’s data has been 
stored by c k already and x 
j 
k (t) = 0 marks its data as unique. y i j ( t ) = 
1 indicates CSP c k has received the deduplication-successful mes- 
sage from o i 
k for h 
j 
k . Otherwise, y 
i 
j ( t ) is marked as 0 and h 
j 
k suffers 
from service delay. c k only pays rf k to o 
i 
k when y 
i 
j ( t ) = 1 . 
Fig. 2 is the detailed parameter-setting algorithm, which is pro- 
posed based on (8) and (17) to ensure the existence of a cloud 
storage system and encourage data owners to accept C-DEDU, re- 
spectively. On the input of the state of all data holders y i 
j ( t − 1 ) , 
and sc k , oc 
i 
o , CSP c k can calculate its sf k , rf k , and the discount α
i 
k ( t ) 
for the next time by executing Algorithm 1. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the discount-granting algorithm, which can be 
described as follows. If the data of a holder is detected as dupli- 
cated (i.e., x 
j 
i ( t ) = 1 ), CSP c k grants the discount calculating from 
Algorithm 1 to it. CSP c k will not pay the request fee to o 
i 
k if it has 
not returned the deduplication-successful message of h 
j 
k . In detail, 
CSP c k only pays the request fee rf k to o 
i 
k when y 
i 
j ( t ) = 1 . According 
to our scheme assumption, no fake deduplication-successful mes- 
sage exists in this system. Therefore, o i 
k will not gain any illegal 
rf k . 
Only when the incentive provided by the CSP satisﬁed the in- 
dividual rationality and incentive compatibility of data owners and 
data holders, will they choose to be honest. Therefore, we propose 
Algorithm 3 (shown in Fig. 4 ) and Algorithm 4 (shown in Fig. 5 ) 
based on Propositions 4 and 7 , respectively. 
Fig. 4 illustrates what strategy a rational data owner will choose 
with the parameters b f k , r f k , s f k , oc 
i 
o α
i 
k ( t ) , and its private infor- 
mation εi . 
It is diﬃcult for a data holder to gain the value of εi , since εi 
is the private information. However, they can infer the oﬄine pos- 
sibility ε of the whole system through social networks. Therefore, 
we can take ε as the public oﬄine probability of the storage sys- 
tem, which is related to all εi . 
6. Evaluation 
We conducted a set of experiments to analyze the effectiveness 
of our incentive mechanism in promoting the acceptance of the 
C-DEDU scheme by all system players. In this section, we also dis- 
cuss how to make the incentive mechanism compatible with exist- 
ing deduplication schemes and its scalability and robustness with 
regard to modiﬁcation attacks. 
Fig. 2. The algorithm to set CSP parameters. 
Fig. 3. The algorithm to grant discounts for a CSP. 
Fig. 4. The algorithm to compute the optimal strategy for a rational data owner. 
6.1. Experimental settings 
The data used in our experiments were collected from section 
contrib ( b23, 0 0 0 0 ) in the Debian Popularity Contest ( b24, 0 0 0 0 ), 
which includes the usage of Debian packages. We recorded the 
number of installations for each package to simulate the number 
of data users. We took a snapshot on the 19th June 2018. The to- 
tal number of package installations is 309052 and the total num- 
ber of the package is 434. Therefore, in our dataset, the number 
of data ﬁles is 434 and the total number of data users is 309052. 
Fig. 5. The algorithm to compute the optimal strategy for a rational data holder. 
These dataset properties are very similar to those of cloud data 
storage. The users who access and download the same package can 
be treated as the data owner (ﬁrst downloader) and its data hold- 
ers (later downloaders). Thus, it is feasible to use this dataset to 
simulate cloud data storage with duplicated data and perform our 
experimental tests. 
There is one CSP and 309052 data users to store 434 unique 
data in each experiment. At the beginning of each experiment, the 
CSP publishes its unit storage fee and the unit request fee to the 
public and calculates its discount for each data user. The data users 
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Table 4 
Parameter settings. 
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value 
bf k 1.5 sf k 1 rf k 0.1 
sc k 0.8 oc k c 0.05 oc 
i 
o 0.05 
αmin 0.001 αmax 0.85 k 2 
εi [0,0.5] ηi [0,5] θ j [0,0.5] 
(i.e., data owners and data holders) independently choose an op- 
timal strategy based on this public information and their private 
information. For a data owner, it chooses to keep online (i.e., hon- 
est) or to be oﬄine with a probability (i.e., strategic). For a data 
holder, it chooses to follow the design of C-DEDU (i.e., honest) or 
modify its data to avoid being detected as duplicated for the sake 
of privacy (i.e., strategic). When they all made decisions, we say 
a time generation has passed. After each time generation, the CSP 
renews the discounts, and then all data users update their strate- 
gies accordingly. When all entities have no incentive to alter their 
strategies from the next time generation on, our game experiment 
reaches the NE state. 
There are no specialized economic models on the discount 
function. In our experiments, we modelled the discount as a 
function of the deduplication percentage. Let αmin and αmax be 
the minimum and maximum discounts that c k can give. we set 
αmin = 0 . 001 to initiate our storage system with C-DEDU. Due 
to the proﬁtability of CSP, αi 
k ( t ) ≤ 1 −
sc k + r f k ×n i ( t ) + oc k c ×n i ( t ) 
s f k ×( 1+ n i ( t ) ) 
= 1 −
sc k 
s f k ×( 1+ n i ( t ) ) 
− r f k + oc k c 
s f k 
× n i ( t ) 
1+ n i ( t ) . Therefore, αmax < min 
{
αi 
k ( t ) 
}
. We 
set αmax = 1 − r f k + oc 
k 
c 
s f k 
in our experiment. The discount function ap- 
plied in our experiments is 
αi k ( t ) = αmin + 
ρ i 
k ( t ) × ( αmax − αmin ) 
k 
, (21) 
where k ≥ 1. 
If the individualized discount is applied, αi 
k ( t ) = α
j 
k ( t ) = ρ i k (t) , 
where f ( j, t ) = i .We calculated the utilities of all stakeholders (i.e. 
data holders, data owners and CSPs) and recorded the deduplica- 
tion percentage of the CSP for each experiment. We summarized 
the system parameter settings in Table 4 as follows. The value of 
bf k , sf k , sc k , rf k and oc 
i 
o were set according to sc k < sf k < bf k and 
oc i o < r f k for ensuring the long-term operation of the CSP. oc 
k 
c was 
set to make sure sc k − r f k − oc k c ≥ 0 . We randomly chose a value 
between 0 and 0.5 as the possibility for a data owner to be oﬄine; 
therefore, εi ∈ [0, 0.5]. We set the value of ηi randomly from 0 to 
5 for each data. Since time-sensitivity is different for different data 
holders, we regulated that θ j obeys a uniform distribution between 
0 and 0.5 (i.e., θ j ~ U (0, 0.5)). The public oﬄine probability ε of the 
system was modeled as the mean of all εi . 
We conducted three experiments. The CSP is without C-DEDU 
in Experiment 1, which is worked as a benchmark. In Experiment 
2, the CSP employs our proposed incentive mechanism with C- 
DEDU. We specify the evaluation indexes in the ﬁrst two experi- 
ments as follows: 
• The average utility of data holders at each time generation; 
• The average utility of data owner at each time generation; 
• The utility of CSP at each time generation; 
• The deduplication percentage of CSP at each time generation. 
To evaluate the inﬂuence of some system parameters ( εi , ηi , 
θ j , to be speciﬁc), we further conducted Experiment 3. The CSP 
and data users are the same as those in Experiment 2. If de- 
note εi ∈ [0, a ], ηi ∈ [0, b ] and θ j ~ U (0, c ), we set a = 
0 . 1 , 0 . 2 , 0 . 3 , 0 . 4 , 0 . 5 , 0 . 6 , 0 . 7 , 0 . 8 , 0 . 9 , 1 , b = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 
and c = 0 . 1 , 0 . 2 , 0 . 3 , 0 . 4 , 0 . 5 , 0 . 6 , 0 . 7 , 0 . 8 , 0 . 9 , 1 in this experiment. 
The evaluation indexes for Experiment 3 are: 
• The average utility of data holders at NE; 
• The average utility of data owner at NE; 
• The utility of CSP at NE; 
• The deduplication percentage of CSP at NE; 
• The time to reach NE. 
6.2. Experimental results 
There are 309052 data users requested to upload data to the 
cloud. If they are the users in a CSP without C-DEDU (i.e., Experi- 
ment 1), the CSP stores their data directly. If they are the users in 
a CSP with C-DEDU and the CSP adopts our incentive mechanism 
(i.e., Experiment 2), the data holders choose to duplicate its data 
or not according to (15) and the data owners choose whether to 
keep online based on (19) . After all users taking actions, one time 
generation passed and the CSP adjusts the discount for the next 
time generation. We plotted the results of Experiment 1 and Ex- 
periment 2 together in Fig. 6 for easy comparison. The solid and 
dotted lines show the results in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, 
respectively. 
Fig. 6 (a)to –(c) show that the utilities of all system stakehold- 
ers (i.e., data owners, data holders and CSP) in the C-DEDU are in- 
creasing with an S-shape as the time generation goes by. All these 
utilities reach the maximum value eventually and stay stable from 
then on. Therefore, there is an NE state of our game model. This 
state is also a social optimal state that our stakeholders obtain the 
largest beneﬁts. Fig. 6 (d) illustrates the deduplication percentage 
variation of the cloud storage system. Under our parameter set- 
tings, the proposed incentive mechanism motivates most of the 
data users to adopt C-DEDU due to obvious proﬁts and the system 
saves more than 90% (92.46% to be speciﬁc) storage spaces at last. 
The reason for the rest users that do not select deduplication is the 
incentive provided by our mechanism is still not enough to com- 
pensate the potential loss of some extreme time-sensitive users 
under our experimental parameter settings. If we adjust a and/or b 
to a smaller value, the deduplication percentage in the equilibrium 
state will be higher than 92.46%. Taking the experimental results 
in Experiment 1 as the benchmark, all the dotted lines are above 
the solid ones. Therefore, the acceptance of C-DEDU is guaranteed 
by our incentive mechanism. 
Experiment 3 was to evaluate the effect of some system param- 
eters: the oﬄine possibility εi of a data owner, the time sensitivity 
θ j of a data holder, and the holder number threshold ηi set by the 
CSP. The detailed evaluation method was to adjust the upper limits 
of the distribution functions to regulate εi , ηi , and θ j , namely the 
value of a, b , and c , and re-execute the procedure in Experiment 2. 
Fig. 7 shows the inﬂuence of εi by setting a from 0.1 to 1 with 
b = 5 and c = 0 . 5 . At the NE state, the utility of the CSP, data own- 
ers and data holders decrease with the increase of a . Only the time 
to reach this state increases while a is increasing. Fig. 7 (d) rep- 
resents the deduplication percentage of the system with different 
a . Furthermore, even when a = 1 (i.e., εi ∈ [0, 1]), the deduplica- 
tion percentage can still be above 85% (87.4739% precisely), which 
means the C-DEDU is accepted by most users. 
The inﬂuence of ηi was tested by setting b from 1 to 10 with 
a = 0 . 5 and c = 0 . 5 . As illustrated in Fig. 8 , the utilities of all stake- 
holders and the deduplication percentage at the NE state share 
the same decrease trend with the increase of b . The reason for 
this downtrend is that there are some data belongs to less than 
b users that cannot obtain discounts thus be hesitated to accept 
C-DEDU. The hesitation further inﬂuences the deduplication per- 
centage, which is directly linked to the discount. Nevertheless, 
the inﬂuence is not so serious since the deduplication percentage 
Fig. 6. The results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2: (a) the average utility of data owners; (b) the average utility of data holders; (c) the utility of the CSP; (d) the system 
deduplication percentage in different time generations. 
Fig. 7. The effect of a on: (a) the utility of CSP at NE; (b) the average utility of data owners at NE; (c) the average utility of data holders at NE; (d) the deduplication 
percentage of a storage system at NE; (e) time to reach NE. 
Fig. 8. The effect of b on: (a) the utility of CSP at NE; (b) the average utility of data owners at NE; (c) the average utility of data holders at NE; (d) the system deduplication 
percentage at NE; (e) time to reach NE. 
Fig. 9. The effect of c on: (a) the utility of CSP at NE; (b) the average utility of data owners at NE; (c) the average utility of data holders at NE; (d) the system deduplication 
percentage at NE; (e) time to reach NE. 
still remains at a high level (above 89% in Fig. 8 )(d). The time to 
reach NE fall between the 9th generation and the 10th generation 
mostly. 
To evaluate the inﬂuence of θ j , we ﬁxed a = 0 . 5 and b = 5 while 
varying c from 0.1 to 1 and plotted the experimental results in 
Fig. 9 . All the evaluation indexes for Experiment 3, except the time 
to reach NE, decline with the increase of c . Notably, even though 
the indexes are decreased, they are still higher than those in Ex- 
periment 1. 
In a nutshell, taking the results in Experiment 1 as the bench- 
mark, we evaluated the acceptance of C-DEDU with our proposed 
incentive mechanism in Experiment 2. The increase of deduplica- 
tion percentage shows C-DEDU is gradually accepted. Even though 
the percentage would decrease when adjusting some parameters, 
the inﬂuence is not signiﬁcant. Therefore, our incentive mechanism 
guarantees the widely adoption of C-DEDU. 
6.3. Further discussions 
In this section, we further discuss the compatibility of our in- 
centive mechanism when being applied into existing cloud data 
deduplication schemes and its scalability and robustness when be- 
ing triggered with modiﬁcation attacks, where the cloud users at- 
tempt to modify their data stored in the cloud. 
Herein, we ﬁrst illustrate how our incentive mechanism works 
based on the procedure of the deduplication scheme in Yan et al. 
(2016b) . The parameters, x 
j 
i (t) and y 
i 
j (t) , needed to be collected 
in our incentive mechanism are compatible with the deduplication 
scheme in Yan et al. (2016b) . Speciﬁcally, the value of x 
j 
i (t) indi- 
cates the result of duplication check, which is the inevitable pro- 
cess in deduplication. Furthermore, once a data owner performs 
deduplication successfully, it will send the deduplication-successful 
message to the CSP so that it can obtain its request fee as compen- 
sation. This message is recorded as y i 
j (t) in our mechanism. 
To apply our incentive mechanism in ClearBox 
( Armknecht et al., 2015 ), which is also a client-controlled dedu- 
plication scheme, the value of x 
j 
i (t) is easy to determine since 
the owner will check if any other clients have already uploaded 
the same data. When the data has already been stored and the 
user passes the possession veriﬁcation, the owner will append this 
user to the data structure. This operation can be approximately 
regarded as sending the deduplication-successful messages in 
Yan et al. (2016b) , thus the value of y i 
j (t) is also decided. 
Heen et al. (2012) proposed a client-controlled deduplication 
scheme that can resist the side-channel attack. In this scheme, a 
new gateway server is introduced as the proxy of a data owner to 
perform deduplication. The gateway client checks the existence of 
a piece of data at the storage space of the gateway server (that 
can be considered as the CSP), thus duplication check happens and 
x 
j 
i (t) is determined. Furthermore, the gateway server handles the 
other users’ upload requests of the same data, therefore, it can cal- 
culate y i 
j (t) as well. 
In a nutshell, our incentive mechanism is compatible with not 
only the deduplication scheme in Yan et al. (2016b) but also Clear- 
Box ( Liu et al., 2015 ) and the one that resists to side-channel at- 
tacks ( Heen et al., 2012 ). Thanks to the compatibility, introducing 
this incentive mechanism to existing deduplication schemes bur- 
dens no extra communication costs. The computational complexity 
is only linearly related to the number of data users. 
Our incentive mechanism can also suppress the dishonest be- 
haviors of data owners. If an owner conducts a modiﬁcation at- 
tack then its data will be regarded as unique, it will not gain the 
compensation from deduplication. Moreover, the owner can hardly 
obtain the discount of storage-service fee when applying our in- 
dividualized discount-based incentive. Without concrete proof, we 
are safe to conclude that our incentive mechanism is scalable to 
the application scenario with the modiﬁcation attack and is robust 
to this attack. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we detailed an economic model for cloud storage 
systems with C-DEDU. A game theoretical approach is employed 
to analyze the feasibilities of two discount-based incentive mech- 
anisms: uniﬁed discount and individualized discount. The uniﬁed 
discount ensures data privacy but introduces free-riding behaviors, 
which is diﬃcult to eliminate without changing the design of C- 
DEDU. The individualized discount can suppress free-riding behav- 
iors in some cases; however, data holders can infer some private 
information from the discount value. To address this privacy is- 
sue, we further proposed an adapted privacy-preserving individ- 
ualized discount-based incentive mechanism with the concern of 
individual rationality, incentive compatibility and proﬁtability. Cor- 
responding algorithms were proposed as well to show the practical 
implementation of our mechanisms. Comprehensive experiments 
based on a real dataset further illustrated the effectiveness of our 
incentive mechanisms for the ﬁnal acceptance of C-DEDU. 
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